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RAMSHACKLE FEDERALISM:  
AMERICA’S ARCHAIC AND DYSFUNCTIONAL 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SYSTEM 
Anthony J. Gaughan* 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the presidency is the most powerful public office in the United 
States, the federal government plays a modest role in presidential elections.  
Reflecting the nation’s foundation on federalist principles, federal 
involvement in the presidential election system is largely limited to 
protecting voter rights and regulating campaign contributions. 
In most other key respects, the election system is decentralized to a 
remarkable degree.  Unique among major democracies, the American 
presidential election is administered by over 13,000 state and local 
jurisdictions.1  Those jurisdictions have widely different rules regarding 
everything from the type of ballot used to the methods employed in 
recounts.  Most remarkable of all, the President is determined not by a 
nationwide popular vote but rather by a complicated Electoral College 
formula that emphasizes winning states rather than winning a national 
majority of votes overall. 
The extremely decentralized nature of the American presidential election 
system may reflect the triumph of federalism, but it is a shambolic and 
ramshackle version of federalism.  The uncomfortable truth is that the 
United States relies on an archaic and dysfunctional process for electing the 
most powerful leader in the world.  Although the Constitution has 
sacrosanct status in American popular imagination, the nation’s founding 
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University of Minnesota, 1993.  The author would like to thank Jerry Goldfeder and the 
editors of the Fordham Law Review for the invitation to participate in the forum.  This 
Article is part of a forum entitled Election Law and the Presidency held at Fordham 
University School of Law. 
 
 1. See ALEC C. EWALD, THE WAY WE VOTE:  THE LOCAL DIMENSION OF AMERICAN 
SUFFRAGE 3–8 (2009); MARTHA KROPF & DAVID C. KIMBALL, HELPING AMERICA VOTE:  THE 
LIMITS OF ELECTION REFORM 114 (2012); PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE 
AMERICAN VOTING EXPERIENCE:  REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL 
COMMISSION ON ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 1 (2014), https://www.supportthevoter.gov/ 
files/2014/01/Amer-Voting-Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5KW-6Q 
YD]; Jill Ornitz, Donald Trump Claims the Election Might Be “Rigged.”  Here’s How 
Voting Really Works, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2016, 9:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/ 
politics/la-na-pol-presidential-election-process-20160812-snap-htmlstory.html 
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document is part of the problem.  Article II establishes the antidemocratic 
Electoral College for electing the President.  Since 1789, four candidates 
have won the presidency despite losing the popular vote, and seven other 
candidates have come close to achieving the same feat.2  Even in routine 
elections, the Electoral College fails to promote the federalist cause of 
empowering the states.  Every four years, it discriminates against forty 
states by making ten states singularly important in electing the President.3 
The outdated nature of the Electoral College only scratches the surface of 
the election system’s problems.  For example, federal campaign 
contribution limits treat presidential candidates as though they are 
competing for local office rather than running to lead a country of 320 
million people.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s Citizens United v. FEC4 
decision compounded the problem by giving outside groups a huge 
fundraising advantage over candidate campaigns.  Even incumbent 
Presidents seeking reelection must now rely on the assistance of 
unaccountable Super PACs.5  Equally problematic, the byzantine, parochial, 
and decentralized nature of the American presidential election system 
renders the country poorly prepared for resolving close contests in a fair and 
accurate manner.  Moreover, despite many warnings, the government has 
failed to adequately plan for potential election disruptions such as terrorism, 
cyberattacks, and natural disasters. 
We can and must do better.  Accordingly, this Article proposes five 
sensible and achievable reforms to modernize the presidential election 
system.  Each requires Congress and the federal government to play a much 
more proactive role in the presidential election system.  The Constitution 
may be founded on federalist principles, but excessive decentralization is 
not serving us well in presidential election administration.  In an age of 
tumultuous and accelerating change, the presidential election system must 
be modernized to meet the needs of twenty-first century America. 
I.  AN ARCHAIC AND DYSFUNCTIONAL 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SYSTEM 
America’s election system has failed to keep pace with the modern age in 
four critical areas:  (1) the financing of presidential campaigns, (2) the 
method of electing the President, (3) the administration of elections, and (4) 
the management of emergency planning.  The disorganized and outdated 
system undermines America’s status as one of the world’s leading 
democracies. 
 
 2. GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, WHY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD FOR AMERICA 57–73 
(2004). 
 3. See generally PRESIDENTIAL SWING STATES:  WHY ONLY TEN MATTER (Stacey 
Hunter Hecht & David Schultz eds., 2015). 
 4. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 5. Robert Barnes, Alito v. Obama:  Reactions Split on Obama’s Remark, Alito’s 
Response at State of the Union, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2010), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/28/AR2010012802893.html 
[https://perma.cc/X4RJ-DZU4]. 
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A.  A Broken Presidential Campaign Finance System 
The problems with the presidential election system begin with federal 
campaign finance law.  Although the public and media view the American 
election system as awash in money, the reality is that is only half true.  In 
the landmark 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo,6 the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of contribution limits but ruled that expenditure caps 
impermissibly burdened citizens’ First Amendment rights.7  Consequently, 
the United States is one of the few advanced democracies in the world that 
imposes low contribution limits on candidates but no overall expenditure 
caps.8 
American regulators’ focus on low contribution limits is a product of the 
Watergate scandal of the 1970s.  In response to the Nixon administration’s 
scandalous fundraising practices, Congress established a $1,000 limit on 
contributions to federal candidates as part of the 1974 amendments to the 
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).9  In the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2003 (BCRA), Congress raised the limit to $2,000 and 
indexed it to inflation.10  In the 2015–2016 election cycle, the federal 
contribution limit for individuals was $2,700 per election.11 
The extraordinarily low level of federal contribution limits is apparent 
when contrasted with the massive amounts spent on federal campaigns, 
especially in presidential races.  In 2012, federal election costs reached a 
record high of $7 billion.12  Controlling for inflation, federal campaign 
costs were four times higher in 2008 than in 1972,13 and costs continue to 
go up.  Between 1984 and 2012, federal campaign costs rose 555 percent, a 
faster rate than the increase in healthcare expenditures.14  The skyrocketing 
cost of presidential campaigns reflects the unavoidable fact that political 
commercials, campaign staff, and nationwide travel are exceedingly 
expensive in a continent-wide country of 320 million people. 
The combination of low contribution limits and no expenditure caps puts 
presidential candidates on a relentless fundraising treadmill like no other 
 
 6. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 7. See id. at 58. 
 8. See Paul Waldman, How Our Campaign Finance System Compares to Other 
Countries, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 4, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/how-our-campaign-
finance-system-compares-other-countries [https://perma.cc/45MM-HNR9]. 
 9. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27. 
 10. See Anthony Corrado, Money and Politics:  A History of Federal Campaign Finance 
Law, in THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 7, 41 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 
2005). 
 11. See Quick Answers to General Questions, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/ans/ 
answers_general.shtml (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/UL5N-VZNN]. 
 12. See Press Release, FEC, FEC Summarizes Campaign Activity of the 2011–2012 
Election Cycle (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.fec.gov/press/press2013/20130419_2012-24m-
Summary.shtml [https://perma.cc/L5K8-A68S]. 
 13. See Dave Gilson, The Crazy Cost of Becoming President, from Lincoln to Obama, 
MOTHER JONES (Feb. 20, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/ 
02/historic-price-cost-presidential-elections [https://perma.cc/GJ44-26QY]. 
 14. See Michael Scherer, Pratheek Rebala & Chris Wilson, The Incredible Rise in 
Campaign Spending, TIME (Oct. 23, 2014, 12:39 PM), http://time.com/3534117/the-
incredible-rise-in-campaign-spending/ [https://perma.cc/T9AA-NJHP]. 
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major western democracy.15  The daunting challenge of campaign 
fundraising deters many worthy candidates from running for office.16  The 
2016 campaign was no exception.  In 2015, Hillary Clinton’s presidential 
campaign raised $112 million, the most ever for a Democratic presidential 
candidate in a preelection year.17  Clinton’s fundraising advantage was a 
significant factor in Vice President Joseph Biden’s decision not to enter the 
race.18 
On the Republican side, Jeb Bush’s failure to convert his $130 million 
war chest into primary victories does not disprove the importance of 
fundraising.19  The vast majority of Bush’s money was controlled by his 
Super PAC,20 which could receive unlimited donations, and not by the Bush 
campaign itself, which was limited to contributions in amounts of $2,700.  
Barred from coordinating with Bush himself, the Super PAC made the 
questionable decision to attack Florida Senator and GOP presidential 
candidate Marco Rubio rather than focus its attack on Donald Trump, the 
eventual Republican nominee.21  Jeb Bush’s own campaign committee 
lacked the funds necessary to mount a sustained advertising onslaught on 
Trump when there might still have been a chance to stop the reality TV 
star’s momentum.22  Trump’s success in the Republican primaries reflected 
 
 15. Justice White predicted just such a development in his Buckley dissent. See Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 265 (1976) (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
 16. See FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE:  MYTHS AND REALITIES 188 
(1992); PETER J. WALLISON & JOEL M. GORA, BETTER PARTIES, BETTER GOVERNMENT:  A 
REALISTIC PROGRAM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 12–13 (2009). 
 17. See Reena Flores, Hillary Clinton Raises $55 Million in Fourth-Quarter 
Fundraising, CBS NEWS (Jan. 1, 2016, 2:15 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/hillary-
clinton-raises-55-million-in-fourth-quarter-fundraising/ [https://perma.cc/JV4V-DFKY]. 
 18. See Gloria Borger et al., Inside Biden’s Decision Not to Run, CNN (Oct. 22, 2015, 
11:18 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/21/politics/joe-biden-2016-decision-timeline/ 
(“Biden concluded there was simply not sufficient time left to raise enough money.”) 
[https://perma.cc/576C-GU62]. 
 19. See Nicholas Confessore & Sarah Cohen, How Jeb Bush Spent $130 Million 
Running for President with Nothing to Show for It, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/us/politics/jeb-bush-campaign.html [https://perma.cc/ 
Q3EN-V7VJ]. 
 20. See Seema Mehta, Super PAC Consultant Who Spent $100 Million on Jeb Bush Is 
Unapologetic, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-
mike-murphy-20160308-story.html [https://perma.cc/SS6X-AB5N]; see also Matea Gold, 
Nearly $100 Million in Super PAC Money Couldn’t Save Jeb Bush, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/02/20/nearly-100-
million-in-super-pac-money-couldnt-save-jeb-bush/ [https://perma.cc/T2FE-48XM]. 
 21. See Farai Chideya, Trump Attack Ads Are Finally Popping Up, but They Might Be 
Too Late, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 15, 2016, 5:00 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/ 
trump-attack-ads-are-finally-popping-up-but-they-might-be-too-late/ [https://perma.cc/7FD 
B-W5XY]; Ashley Parker & Maggie Haberman, As Jeb Bush Struggles, Some Allies Blame 
His “Super PAC,” N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22/us/ 
politics/jeb-bush-right-to-rise-super-pac.html [https://perma.cc/YY7M-EGCR]; Eli Stokols, 
Republicans Warn Bush Team Against Harming Rubio, POLITICO (Jan. 13, 2016, 5:10 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/01/republicans-warn-bush-team-against-harming-rubio-
217651 [https://perma.cc/FSX2-UM7V]. 
 22. See Peter Overby, Arnie Seipel & Domenico Montanaro, As Bush Campaign Goes 
down, the Knives Come Out, NPR (Feb. 23, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/02/ 
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the potent media power wielded by celebrities.  Indeed, a March 2016 study 
found that Trump’s celebrity status and unrivaled access to the national 
media conferred on him free advertising that would have required nearly $2 
billion dollars in paid expenditures for a normal candidate.23 
The vast amounts of money necessary for a noncelebrity to run for the 
White House underscore what a paltry sum $2,700 is for presidential 
candidates.  Indeed, proportionally speaking, the $2,700 contribution limit 
on presidential candidates is effectively far lower than the same 
contribution limit on congressional candidates.  The average U.S. House of 
Representatives district has 710,000 people24 and the average state has 
about six million people.  In contrast, presidential candidates compete in an 
electorate of 320 million people, a task that requires vastly greater 
expenditures.  In 2012, the average House campaign cost $1.5 million and 
the average Senate campaign cost $11 million,25 whereas in the 2012 
presidential election, Barack Obama spent $1.1 billion and Mitt Romney 
spent $1.2 billion.26  Yet, FECA imposes the exact same contribution 
limit—$2,700 per donor per election—on presidential candidates as it does 
on congressional candidates.27 
Low presidential contribution limits also contrast sharply with the higher 
limits that many states place on gubernatorial candidates.  In California, for 
example, gubernatorial candidates may receive individual contributions of 
up to $28,200 per election.28  California is not alone; nineteen other states 
set their contribution limits for gubernatorial candidates above the level 
imposed on presidential candidates by FECA.29  Moreover, twelve states—
including large states like Texas and small states like Iowa—impose no 
contribution limits on gubernatorial and state legislative candidates.30  
Consequently, while a presidential candidate competing in the Iowa 
caucuses is limited to contributions in amounts of $2,700 or less, a state 
legislative candidate running in a small district in rural Iowa may receive 
 
23/467745559/where-did-all-that-jeb-bush-superpac-money-go [https://perma.cc/VJN2-VH 
LR]. 
 23. See Nicholas Confessore & Karen Yourish, $2 Billion Worth of Free Media for 
Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/ 
upshot/measuring-donald-trumps-mammoth-advantage-in-free-media.html [https://perma.cc/ 
3NM6-2G3R]. 
 24. Proportional Representation, HIST. ART & ARCHIVES U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://history.house.gov/Institution/Origins-Development/Proportional-Representation/ (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ZVD6-U5ZQ]. 
 25. See Russ Choma, Money Won on Tuesday, but Rules of the Game Changed, OPEN 
SECRETS (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/11/money-won-on-tuesday-
but-rules-of-the-game-changed/ [https://perma.cc/FU7Y-EFZD]. 
 26. See 2012 Presidential Race, OPEN SECRETS (Mar. 25, 2013), http:// 
www.opensecrets.org/pres12/ [https://perma.cc/KC58-VR69]. 
 27. Quick Answers to General Questions, supra note 11. 
 28. See CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS, STATE LIMITS ON INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO CANDIDATES, PER ELECTION CYCLE (2015), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/2015-07-15_-Limit-Tables_State-Contribution-Limits-On-
Individual-To-Candidate-Giving_Alphabetical-And-Ranked.pdf [https://perma.cc/88PA-P5 
3Y]. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. 
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unlimited donations.  The lack of contribution limits in states like Iowa does 
not lead to higher levels of corruption.31  For example, a 2014 study in the 
Public Administration Review found that Iowa was one of the least corrupt 
states in the country.32 
Two recent changes to the presidential fundraising landscape have 
rendered the $2,700 limit particularly inappropriate and anachronistic.  The 
first is the demise of the presidential public funding system.  When 
Congress adopted the 1974 FECA amendments, it attempted to lessen the 
fundraising burden on presidential candidates by providing federal funds for 
the major party nominees.33  The public funds came with a catch:  
candidates who accepted the funds had to agree to an overall expenditures 
cap.34  But in the 2008 general election, Barack Obama declined to accept 
public funding—a decision that dealt a deathblow to the system35 because 
of the enormous advantage Obama gained from opting out.  John McCain, 
Obama’s opponent, agreed to limit his spending to $84 million in order to 
receive public funding,36 a decision that backfired on the Republican 
nominee’s campaign.  Obama ultimately raised $337 million, an amount 
that permitted him to outspend McCain by a margin of four to one.37  Not 
surprisingly, a postelection survey found that 64 percent of voters 
remembered seeing Obama campaign advertisements, whereas only 12 
percent remembered seeing McCain ads.38  The decisive financial 
advantage the Obama campaign gained by rejecting public funds makes it 
unlikely future candidates will revive the system.39  Serious presidential 
candidates thus have no realistic choice other than to rely exclusively on 
privately raised funds. 
The second major development is the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens 
United decision.40  Under Citizens United and the D.C. Circuit’s subsequent 
decision in Speechnow.org v. FEC,41 independent expenditure groups may 
receive unlimited contributions.42  Citizens United gave rise to Super PACs, 
 
 31. See WALLISON & GORA, supra note 16, at 44 (“[T]here is no evident or prevalent 
pattern of corruption in . . . no-limit states.”). 
 32. See Cheol Liu & John L. Mikesell, The Impact of Public Officials’ Corruption on the 
Size and Allocation of U.S. State Spending, 74 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346, 351 (2014); Chris 
Matthews, The 10 Most Corrupt States in the U.S., FORTUNE (June 10, 2014, 1:55 PM), 
http://fortune.com/2014/06/10/most-corrupt-states-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/6BD9-W6 
NZ]. 
 33. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34534, PUBLIC FINANCING OF 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS:  OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 4–5 (2014); ROBERT E. MUTCH, 
BUYING THE VOTE:  A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 139–44 (2014). 
 34. GARRETT, supra note 33, at 9. 
 35. See Anthony Corrado, Financing the 2008 Presidential General Election, in 
FINANCING THE 2008 ELECTION 127, 159–60 (David B. Magleby & Anthony J Corrado eds., 
2011). 
 36. See GARRETT, supra note 33, at 9. 
 37. Corrado, supra note 35, at 150–51. 
 38. Id. at 159. 
 39. Id. at 159–60. 
 40. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 41. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 42. See RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED:  CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 17–19, 29–33 (2016). 
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outside groups that are exempt from FECA’s contribution limits as long as 
they do not coordinate their activities with candidate campaigns.43  But lost 
in the controversy over Citizens United was the fact that the Court did not 
lift the contribution limits on candidate campaigns.44  The result is 
presidential candidate campaigns face a significant competitive 
disadvantage in fundraising.  Indeed, the Citizens United decision is 
precisely why Jeb Bush’s Super PAC raised $70 million more than his 
campaign did. 
Consequently, even critics have no choice but to embrace Super PACs.  
In his January 2010 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama 
condemned the Citizens United decision for unleashing a flood of money 
into American election campaigns.45  Yet, two years later, Obama himself 
supported the creation of Priorities USA, a pro-Obama Super PAC.46  The 
fact that even an incumbent President needs a Super PAC demonstrates the 
extent to which FECA’s contribution limits have failed to keep up with a 
rapidly changing campaign finance world. 
The collapse of the public funding system and the rise of Super PACs 
have rendered low presidential contribution limits an anachronistic relic of 
the post-Watergate reforms.  But the method of electing the President is 
even more outdated. 
B.  The Electoral College 
Although the media devotes an inordinate amount of coverage to national 
presidential polls,47 the United States does not elect its President through a 
nationwide popular vote.  Under the Electoral College, the presidential race 
is determined by fifty separate state elections plus the three electoral votes 
at stake in the District of Columbia.  The state-oriented nature of the 
Electoral College reflects its ad hoc origins in a political compromise at the 
Constitutional Convention in 1787.48  Although politicians often boast that 
the nation was founded on democratic principles, the reality is that the 
Constitution’s Framers distrusted direct democracy and embraced instead 
 
 43. Id. at 33–34. 
 44. See Quick Answers to General Questions, supra note 11. 
 45. Barnes, supra note 5. 
 46. Lauren Fox, Obama Campaign Gets in the Super PAC Game, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (Feb. 7, 2012, 1:32 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/washington-whispers/ 
2012/02/07/obama-campaign-gets-in-the-super-pac-game- [https://perma.cc/Y5NX-BY4E]; 
Fredreka Schouten, Obama Now Urges Donations to Super PAC Backing Him, USA TODAY 
(Feb. 7, 2012, 11:04 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-02-
07/obama-super-pac-reversal/53002966/1 [https://perma.cc/PTL5-8MSP]. 
 47. See Thomas E. Patterson, News Coverage of the 2016 Presidential Primaries:  
Horse Race Reporting Has Consequences, SHORENSTEIN CTR. (July 11, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
http://shorensteincenter.org/news-coverage-2016-presidential-primaries/ [https://perma.cc/56 
29-LLC9]. 
 48. For a discussion of the ad hoc nature of the Electoral College, see Shlomo Slonim, 
The Electoral College at Philadelphia:  The Evolution of an Ad Hoc Congress for the 
Selection of a President, 73 J. AM. HIST. 35 (1986). 
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the concept of a federal republic composed of sovereign states.49  The 
Electoral College both promoted the Framers’ federalist vision and 
facilitated the Constitution’s adoption by attracting the support of large and 
small, as well as free and slaveholding, states.50  Ever since, one of the 
primary defenses of the Electoral College is that the use of a state-based 
presidential electoral system honors the Framers’ federalist vision.51 
But times have changed.  In 1789, the President was elected by a 
confederation of states that limited suffrage to white male property holders 
and expected citizens to pay their primary allegiance to state, not federal, 
authorities.  In 2016, by contrast, the President leads a diverse, global 
superpower in which the primary allegiance of citizens is to the nation, not 
to one’s state.  The change resulted from the North’s victory in the Civil 
War, which made clear that national authority supersedes state 
sovereignty.52  Thus, by treating the country as a mere confederation of 
states, the Electoral College fails to reflect the remarkable nation that 
America has become. 
The Electoral College also is inconsistent with modern democratic 
norms.53  Democratic values and egalitarian principles play a far more 
central role in American constitutional law today than they did in the 1780s.  
As Akhil Amar has noted, the principle of “one person, one vote” that the 
Supreme Court adopted in the 1964 case Reynolds v. Sims54 has 
transformed “American constitutional practice.”55  The Electoral College, 
in contrast, violates the cornerstone democratic principle of majority rule.  
A product of a bygone age, it invests control of the selection of the 
President in the hands of 538 individual electors rather than the American 
people as a whole.  Although just over half the states have enacted statutes 
 
 49. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE:  THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 3–4, 21–25 (2000); TARA ROSS, ENLIGHTENED 
DEMOCRACY:  THE CASE FOR THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 31–59 (2004). 
 50. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 157–59 (2006); 
DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 
1815–1848, at 61, 282 (2007); Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins of the Electoral 
College, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1145 (2002).  For a contrary view, see generally Earl M. 
Maltz, The Presidency, the Electoral College, and the Three-Fifths Clause, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 
439 (2013). 
 51. See JUDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAINST DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT:  A 
DEFENSE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 119–23, 205–18 (1971); ROSS, supra note 49, at 58 
(“Removing states from the presidential election process would undermine the federalist 
nature of the American republic.”); Gary L. Gregg II, The Origins and Meaning of the 
Electoral College, in SECURING DEMOCRACY:  WHY WE HAVE AN ELECTORAL COLLEGE 1, 
10–26 (Gary L. Gregg II ed., 2001). 
 52. See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 26–44 (2003) (discussing 
sovereignty and federalism). See generally CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS:  
THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (2008); 
FORREST MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION:  IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 1776–1876 
(2000); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987). 
 53. See, e.g., EDWARDS III, supra note 2, at 31–54. 
 54. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 55. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION:  THE PRECEDENTS 
AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 463 (2012). 
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to bind the electors to the state’s popular vote,56 many scholars contend that 
the Constitution empowers electors to vote for whomever they want, even if 
state law directs them to honor the will of the voters.57  History makes clear 
that the problem of faithless electors is not merely conjectural.  Since 1789, 
there have been several isolated cases in which individual electors have 
broken faith with their state’s electorate by voting for someone other than 
the candidate chosen by the state’s voters.58  Potentially, therefore, a 
faithless elector could change the outcome of a close presidential race, a 
scenario that would trigger a constitutional crisis of the highest order.59 
Equally troubling, in the event that no candidate wins a majority of the 
electoral vote, the Constitution directs that the House of Representatives 
determine the presidential contest in what is known as a “contingent” 
election.60  The Twelfth Amendment provides that in the contingent 
election, each House delegation, casting a single vote, must choose from 
among the top three finishers in the Electoral College.61  Balloting 
continues until a candidate wins a majority of state delegations.  As George 
Edwards has observed, the contingent election in the House “represents the 
most egregious violation of democratic principles in the American political 
system” because each state’s vote receives the same weight regardless of 
population.62  Thus, in the contingent election, North Dakota, a state of 
756,000 people, has as much say as California, a state of 39 million.63  
Making matters worse, the Twelfth Amendment is so vague regarding the 
procedures the House should use to elect the President that scholars have 
described the amendment as a “ticking time bomb.”64 
The possibility of a contingent election is rising.  As the 2016 
presidential campaign demonstrated, the American people are profoundly 
dissatisfied with the two major political parties.  A recent Gallup poll 
revealed that Republican and Democratic Party identification is at an all-
time low.65  A 2015 Pew Research Center poll found that 39 percent of 
Americans identify as independents, the highest level in the survey’s 
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seventy-five-year history.66  Thus, polling trends strongly suggest that third-
party candidates could be a major factor in future presidential elections, a 
development that will increase the chances of a three-way split in which no 
candidate receives 270 electoral votes. 
Even from its earliest days, the Electoral College worked poorly.  In 
1800, Thomas Jefferson and his running mate Aaron Burr tied in the 
Electoral College, throwing the election into the House of Representatives 
and setting off a national crisis.67  The deadlock was not resolved until 
February 7, 1801, after thirty-six ballots and Alexander Hamilton’s 
instruction to his Federalist allies to support Jefferson.68  Although the 
adoption of the Twelfth Amendment in 1803 prevented a recurrence of a 
deadlock along the lines of Jefferson-Burr,69 the Electoral College has 
continued to give rise to countermajoritarian results.  John Quincy Adams 
in 1824, Rutherford B. Hayes in 1876, Benjamin Harrison in 1888, and 
George W. Bush in 2000 all won Electoral College majorities despite losing 
the popular vote.70  Moreover, in seven other elections—1836, 1856, 1860, 
1948, 1960, 1968, and 1976—a shift of just a few thousand votes would 
have thrown each of the contests into the House of Representatives.71 
Despite its defenders’ claims, the Electoral College does little to promote 
the “federalist” interests of most states.  Ironically, the Electoral College 
renders much of the country irrelevant in the general election as candidates 
ignore solidly blue or red states to focus instead on a handful of swing 
states like Florida and Ohio.72  Since the 1830s, almost all states have 
awarded their electoral votes on a winner-take-all basis,73 with the sole 
exceptions of Nebraska and Maine.74  The winner-take-all basis of the 
Electoral College renders the forty states that vote reliably Democratic or 
Republican an afterthought in the great majority of presidential elections.  
Whereas every state counts in presidential primaries, the same is not true in 
the general election.  For example, states such as California, New York, 
Alabama, Michigan, Tennessee, and Illinois are routinely ignored by 
presidential candidates during the general election because each of those 
states is either safely Republican or safely Democratic.75  Consequently, the 
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ten “swing” states, including Ohio, Florida, Virginia, and Iowa, monopolize 
the presidential candidates’ attention in the general election.76 
It is also highly revealing that the states themselves do not elect their 
governors through an Electoral College system.  All fifty states elect their 
governors through a direct popular vote and for good reason.77  Electing a 
chief executive through a regionally based election system is an obsolete 
procedure that no sensible polity would embrace unless constitutionally 
required to do so. 
In the end, the best defense of the Electoral College comes from Senator 
Mitch McConnell, who contends that it spares us from the “nightmare” of a 
fifty-state recount in the event of a close popular vote.78  McConnell has a 
point.  As Florida’s inept performance in the 2000 presidential election 
demonstrated, many states do a poor job of administering elections.  
Therefore, any effort to replace the Electoral College must first come to 
grips with the dysfunctional nature of election administration in the states. 
C.  Dysfunctional Election Administration 
Decentralization lies at the heart of the election administration problem.  
As Nathaniel Persily has observed, “The first glaring institutional feature 
evident to even the most casual observer of the U.S. electoral system is the 
extreme decentralization of administrative responsibilities and 
policymaking.”79  The states administer presidential elections using 
different registration rules,80 different ballots and voting machines,81 
different absentee and early voting laws,82 and different postelection audit 
rules.83  Many states rely on aging machines and outdated technology.84  
 
 76. See Scott L. McLean, Purple Battlegrounds:  Presidential Campaign Strategies and 
Swing State Voters, in PRESIDENTIAL SWING STATES:  WHY ONLY TEN MATTER, supra note 3, 
at 1; see also Stacey Hunter Hecht & David Schultz, Why Swing States in American 
Presidential Elections, in PRESIDENTIAL SWING STATES:  WHY ONLY TEN MATTER, supra 
note 3, at 309. 
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Most concerning of all, the states have abdicated their constitutional 
responsibility to administer federal elections by delegating administrative 
duties to counties and municipalities in a process of hyperfederalism.85  
Although some progress has been made in recent years, the inconsistent, 
underfunded, and often haphazard manner86 in which state and local 
authorities administer federal elections has not improved substantially 
enough since the controversial Florida recount in the 2000 presidential 
election.87  Even in non-voter ID states with generous registration 
procedures, such as California, there are arbitrary, conflicting, and 
unpredictable voting standards.  For example, a July 2016 Los Angeles 
Times investigation found that California’s rules for provisional ballots vary 
significantly from county to county.88  
Although the states historically have been hailed as laboratories of 
democracy,89 the rampant decentralization of American election 
administration has not led to salutary results.90  A 2015 study by the 
Electoral Integrity Project ranked the states’ administration of the 2012 U.S. 
presidential race as the most poorly administered election among Western 
democracies that year.91  The report concluded that American electoral 
procedures were inferior to those of nations all over the world, including 
Mexico, the Czech Republic, Japan, and Sierra Leone.92  As Pippa Norris 
has noted, “Among all mature democracies, the nuts and bolts of American 
contests seem notoriously vulnerable to incompetence and simple human 
errors arising from the extreme decentralization and partisanship of 
electoral administration processes.”93 
Partisan election administration deeply undermines the system’s 
integrity.94  In a 2014 report, the Presidential Commission on Election 
Administration noted that “[o]ne of the distinguishing features of the 
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American electoral system is the choosing of election officials and 
administrators through a partisan process.”95  It recommended that state 
election agencies turn to unbiased professional staffers to “bolster the 
voting public’s confidence in the voting process.”96  The states’ failure to 
do so has left the federal judiciary with the unenviable task of adjudicating 
disputes over election administration.97  The result is that courts now find 
themselves routinely enmeshed in partisan controversies.  In an age of 
intense political and ideological polarization, even the Supreme Court is 
viewed as biased during election disputes. 
The 2000 presidential election, which came down to a dispute over the 
election results in Florida, is a case in point.98  The vague and contradictory 
nature of Florida election law, combined with the fact that the five 
Republican-appointed Justices ruled in favor of George Bush and the four 
Democratic-appointed Justices ruled in favor of Al Gore, made the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Bush v. Gore99 profoundly controversial.  Fair or not, the 
ruling left many observers convinced that the Court’s decision was 
motivated by politics, not law.100  The cynicism and bitterness that ensued 
was inevitable in the absence of a neutral tribunal formally tasked with 
resolving election disputes. 
D.  Lack of Security and Resiliency 
Most troubling of all, the American presidential election system lacks 
adequate security and resiliency in the event of a national crisis. 
The potential threats that could befall the nation during or immediately 
before a presidential election are both very real and very dangerous.  
Terrorism is the most obvious threat, one that has already disrupted an 
American election.  An overlooked aspect of the devastating September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks is the fact that they occurred on New York State’s 
primary election day.  The resulting chaos prompted Governor George 
Pataki to postpone the election.101  It is all too conceivable that terrorists 
might target polling places to disrupt a future presidential election.102  And 
terrorism is not the only means of undermining an election.  The 
involvement of Russian hackers in the 2016 election chillingly 
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demonstrated that cyberattacks pose an equally grave threat to the 
presidential election process.103 
Natural disasters may pose the greatest threat of all.  As Jerry Goldfeder 
has warned, a hurricane during a presidential election could prevent 
millions of Americans from voting.104  History underscores the danger.  
Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 forced the 
postponement of primary elections in Florida and Louisiana.105  Similar 
hurricanes might occur anywhere along the Gulf Coast and East Coast on a 
presidential Election Day because hurricane season lasts until late 
November.  In 2012, Hurricane Sandy made landfall in late October and 
impacted fifteen states.106  Other natural disasters, such as an earthquake on 
the West Coast or a tornado outbreak in a major midwestern or southern 
city, could have a similarly disruptive impact.  Climate change will only 
further heighten the risk. 
Nevertheless, despite the clear dangers, Congress and most states have 
failed to engage in systematic and coordinated contingency planning for 
disruptive “black swan” type events.107  The lack of adequate planning 
undermines the ability of election officials to respond effectively to crises 
that occur on or shortly before Election Day.  A 2013 study of the impact of 
Hurricane Sandy found that a lack of emergency preparations and 
procedures resulted in significant disruptions to local and state elections in 
New York and New Jersey.108  The study highlighted the lack of 
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contingency plans “detailing what should be done to preserve the election 
process in the event of an emergency.”109 
In response, some states have enacted new legislation providing for 
emergency election procedures during terrorist attacks or natural 
disasters.110  California, for example, authorizes the state government to 
cancel and reschedule an election in the event of a major disaster.111  
However, like the rest of the presidential election system, the state laws 
governing emergency election procedures are far from uniform.112  A 2014 
survey by the National Association of Secretaries of State only found 
twelve states with laws permitting the postponement or rescheduling of an 
election in the event of an emergency.113 
Unfortunately, Congress has failed to promote standard, uniform policies 
for handling emergencies during presidential elections.114  Nor has 
Congress offered a comprehensive federal plan for assisting states in 
safeguarding polling places against terrorist attacks or electronic hacking.  
The result is a nation dangerously unprepared for a major crisis during a 
presidential election. 
II.  FIXING A BROKEN SYSTEM 
Congress must take responsibility for modernizing our presidential 
election system.  In light of the piecemeal nature of state election law 
reform and the pressing need for uniform laws in presidential election 
administration, Congress is the only government institution in a realistic 
position to promote comprehensive reform.  The time for Congress to act 
has arrived. 
A.  Constitutional Obstacles to Reform 
The Constitution does not make it easy for Congress to reform the 
presidential election system.  The nation’s founding document provides for 
a relatively small role for the federal government in the administration of 
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presidential elections.115  Congress is authorized to guard against 
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and age, and it may enforce due 
process and equal protection rights against state violations.116  It also may 
set the day on which the presidential election occurs and the day that the 
electors meet to formally select the President.117  In addition, the Supreme 
Court has held that Congress may regulate campaign contributions to 
prevent quid pro quo corruption.118  In virtually all other respects, state and 
local authorities play the central role in American presidential elections.119 
But history shows that sweeping reform to the American election system 
is still possible.  One hundred years ago, the United States implemented 
major election changes, including adopting primary elections, providing for 
the direct election of Senators, and enfranchising women.  The anti-
status quo spirit of the 2016 election suggests that American politics are 
once again ripe for a new era of systemic reform. 
B.  Five Reform Proposals 
There are many potential changes that could be made to the presidential 
election system, but five stand out as particularly necessary and pressing. 
1.  Higher Contribution Limits 
In an election system characterized by privately financed campaigns and 
no expenditure limits, it is unreasonable to require presidential candidates to 
raise money in the same increments—$2,700 per donor per election—that 
candidates for House seats do.  A far higher contribution threshold, such as 
a $50,000 per-election limit indexed to inflation, is a much more sensible 
approach in a nation of 320 million people.  After all, presidential 
candidates are not merely running for statewide office or a local 
congressional seat.  They are running to lead the United States, the single 
most expensive media market in the world.  Accordingly, candidates should 
be permitted to raise funds in amounts proportionate to the cost of 
presidential campaigns. 
Raising contribution limits also will help ensure that Super PACs do not 
supplant candidate campaigns in presidential elections.  As scholars such as 
Raymond La Raja120 and Nathaniel Persily121 have argued, the fundraising 
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power of shadowy and unaccountable outside groups threatens to push 
candidate campaigns and political parties to the margins of the American 
election system.  A $50,000 limit would mitigate the fundraising power 
currently exercised by Super PACs by facilitating candidate campaigns’ 
ability to quickly raise funds. 
The corruption risk posed by large contributions in presidential 
campaigns is far less than that posed by donations to House and Senate 
campaigns.  Once elected, Presidents have unrivalled access to free media, 
making them less dependent on continuing donor support than other federal 
officeholders.  Moreover, a $50,000 donation constitutes a modest 
contribution in the context of billion-dollar presidential campaigns.  The 
special scrutiny presidential campaign contributors receive provides an 
additional safeguard.  The Federal Election Commission (FEC) publicly 
discloses contributions made to federal candidates122 and presidential 
campaign donations elicit intense media coverage and public interest.  In 
contrast, federal law permits section 501(c)(4) public advocacy groups to 
engage in independent political expenditures without publicly disclosing 
their contributors.123  Encouraging donors to contribute to presidential 
candidates thus increases the transparency of our campaign finance process 
by diverting some funds that might otherwise have gone to 
section 501(c)(4) “dark money” groups.124 
To be sure, raising contribution limits will no doubt be unpopular with 
the public.  But that unpopularity will be lessened by the fact that Congress 
would not be raising its own contribution limits, only those of presidential 
candidates.  Moreover, Congress seems receptive to the idea of raising 
limits.  In December 2014, Congress quietly raised contribution limits for 
the national party committees,125 evidence that a bipartisan approach to 
increased contribution limits is politically viable. 
Although the massive cost of presidential campaigns has been a fact of 
American political life for more than half a century, absurdly low 
contribution limits for presidential candidates should not be.  Congress 
needs to adjust to the realities of the modern fundraising landscape by 
significantly raising contribution limits for presidential candidates. 
2.  Direct Election 
The reforms should not stop at increased contribution limits.  Structural 
changes are also necessary.  In order to modernize the American 
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presidential election system, the time has come to replace the Electoral 
College with a direct popular vote for President. 
The idea of repealing the Electoral College is not a pipe dream.  It has 
had strong support in the past.  In 1969, the U.S. House of Representatives 
voted by an overwhelming margin of 338 to 10 to adopt a constitutional 
amendment to replace the Electoral College with a direct election of the 
President.126  National polls continue to find high levels of support for 
replacing the Electoral College with a nationwide popular vote.  A 2013 
Gallup poll found that 63 percent of Americans overall, and 69 percent of 
Americans under thirty, support amending the Constitution to provide for 
direct election of the President.127 
Ultimately, there are two ways to do so.  The first is through a 
constitutional amendment, which offers the best long-term solution.  A 
constitutional amendment for a direct election would be simple and 
straightforward to draft and explain to voters.  Many advocates of a direct 
election have promoted a runoff system if no candidate carries at least 40 
percent of the popular vote in a multicandidate field.128  It is worth noting, 
however, that the states’ experience in gubernatorial elections suggests that 
a minimum number of votes is not a necessity for electing a chief executive.  
In any case, runoff or no runoff, a direct election would be a far more 
democratic method of electing the President than the Electoral College. 
The reality, however, is that constitutional amendments do not happen 
overnight.  In the meantime, therefore, the “National Popular Vote 
Compact” is a potentially viable short-term alternative.  The compact is an 
agreement by individual states to award their electoral votes to whichever 
candidate wins the national popular vote.129  The compact will go into 
effect when states possessing 270 electoral votes—the minimum necessary 
to elect the President—sign onto the plan.130 
But whichever comes first—constitutional amendment or National 
Popular Vote Compact—any shift to a direct popular vote for President 
must be accompanied by comprehensive reform of election administration 
in the states. 
3.  Uniform Election Administration 
Defenders of the Electoral College make two important points that must 
be addressed.  The first is that the American election administration system 
as it currently exists is not capable of producing a clear-cut popular vote 
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winner in a close election.131  The second is that abolition of the Electoral 
College would open the door to state manipulation of voting standards to 
game the election results.132 
Those warnings should be taken seriously by advocates of Electoral 
College repeal.  A direct popular vote will work smoothly only if all fifty 
states adopt uniform voting laws in presidential elections, particularly with 
respect to voter registration, ballot standards, early voting periods, and 
voting machine technologies.  Clearly, a uniform standard nationwide will 
not come without a fight.  Local and state bureaucratic interests will resist 
efforts to reform the system.  In 2014, the Presidential Commission on 
Election Administration (“the Commission”) noted that, when it began its 
work, multiple election administrators at the state and local level insisted 
that “one size does not fit all.”133  But as the Commission justifiably 
emphasized in its final report, “most jurisdictions that administer elections 
confront a similar set of challenges” and jurisdictions “can learn from each 
other about the best solutions to common problems.”134  Accordingly, the 
bipartisan commission proposed sweeping and uniform reforms, including 
nationwide online voter registration, improved management of polling place 
location and design, expanded early voting, enhanced mail balloting 
security, and modernized voting machines.135 
The U.S. Constitution does not expressly grant Congress the power to 
mandate that the states adopt uniform standards in presidential elections.136  
The Elections Clause, however, gives Congress sweeping authority over 
congressional elections.137  Consequently, by requiring uniform standards 
in congressional elections, Congress could indirectly achieve the same 
result for presidential elections. 
Moreover, through its spending power authority,138 Congress has 
tremendous leverage over the states.  State election costs are high and 
rising.139  In an age of tight budgets, states may not be as wedded to 
idiosyncratic local practices as their federalist rhetoric would otherwise 
suggest.  Indeed, through the strategic use of financial incentives, Congress 
very likely could persuade the states to adopt uniform standards for 
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presidential election administration rather than delegating those duties to 
local authorities.  The states would still be free to use state-specific 
registration and voting laws for their local and state elections. 
There are historical precedents for the use of federal financial incentives 
to promote uniform state laws.  For example, the threat to withdraw federal 
highway funds was highly effective at achieving a nationwide legal 
drinking age of twenty-one.  In South Dakota v. Dole,140 the Supreme Court 
held that the Spending Clause authorized Congress to use financial 
incentives to promote national standards.141  There are of course limits to 
the spending power.  As the Supreme Court made clear in the 2012 
Affordable Care Act case, National Federation of Independent Businesses 
v. Sebelius,142 Congress may not coerce the states by threatening to 
withdraw funds they have grown dependent upon.143  But in the context of 
uniform voting laws, the use of financial incentives would not be coercive 
at all.  Instead, the federal financial assistance would be offered on a purely 
voluntary basis.  The power of the purse thus provides Congress with a 
powerful tool for promoting uniform standards in presidential elections. 
But uniform standards are not possible until the country resolves the 
debate over voter ID laws.  Republican-controlled states, such as Kansas, 
Georgia, and Mississippi, have adopted strict photo ID laws that contrast 
sharply with the less burdensome voter identification policies employed in 
Democratic-controlled states, such as New York, Minnesota, and 
California.144  The diversity in state laws would be particularly dangerous 
during a nationwide popular vote for President.  As Derek Muller has 
warned, in a direct election, states could manipulate their voting laws to 
promote a partisan advantage in the presidential race.145 
Accordingly, any move to a direct election must be made contingent 
upon nationwide voting standards that reject strict voter ID laws.  The 
argument that photo ID requirements prevent fraud in any significant way is 
simply no longer sustainable.  In the most comprehensive study ever 
undertaken of in-person voter fraud, Justin Levitt found only thirty-one 
credible cases nationwide out of one billion votes cast since 2000.146 
The evidence is increasingly compelling that the drive for strict voter ID 
laws by Republican legislatures was not inspired by an effort to preserve 
electoral integrity but rather by the indefensible and unconstitutional goal of 
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disenfranchising the Democratic Party’s minority constituencies.147  Indeed, 
a federal judge in Wisconsin reached exactly that conclusion in a July 2016 
case, holding that the Republican legislature’s “objective was to suppress 
the reliably Democratic vote of Milwaukee’s African-Americans.”148  
Accordingly, the judicial tide is moving sharply against strict voter ID laws. 
In the summer of 2016, restrictive voter registration laws were struck down 
or blocked by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, as well as by district courts in 
North Dakota, Kansas, and Wisconsin.149  Although the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of strict photo ID requirements in the 2008 case 
of Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,150 the long-term viability of 
that opinion seems highly questionable in light of growing evidence of the 
racially discriminatory motivations for such laws.  Crawford’s reversal 
should be welcomed by advocates of a direct presidential election because it 
would clear the way for the standardization of voting procedures 
nationwide.  In the end, whether abolition of racially discriminatory voting 
laws occurs through the courts or the legislatures, the universal adoption of 
sensible and nonpartisan voting laws is essential before a nationwide 
popular vote can be effectively implemented. 
4.  Impartial Electoral Count Tribunal 
Even with uniform laws nationwide, close presidential elections will still 
give rise to partisan disputes over the outcome.  As Edward Foley has 
warned, the history of American elections makes clear that “ballot-counting 
disputes inevitably will occur despite a state’s best efforts to avoid 
them.”151  To address that problem, Foley proposes the creation of an 
“Electoral Count Tribunal.”152  Under Foley’s proposal, every four years—
in advance of the presidential election—the Supreme Court would be 
responsible for appointing by unanimous vote a three-member tribunal with 
jurisdiction to resolve disputes over state electoral votes.153  Congress could 
create the tribunal by acting under its Twelfth Amendment power to receive 
the electoral votes of the states.154  In addition, Foley advises moving the 
Electoral College calendar back two weeks to give the states additional time 
to complete recounts.155 
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Even without adopting a direct election system, Congress would be wise 
to adopt Foley’s recommendations.  But if the United States replaces the 
Electoral College with a nationwide popular vote, it would be critically 
important to adopt Foley’s proposals.  In a close national race in which 
every vote could be decisive to the outcome, an impartial body tasked with 
resolving recount disputes would be indispensable.  Without it, we could 
end up with fifty disputed state recounts, an outcome far more chaotic than 
what the nation experienced during Florida’s controversial recount in 2000. 
Likewise, a longer state recount period will be absolutely necessary when 
the total number of popular votes—rather than the total number of electoral 
votes—determines the winner of the presidential election.  The Supreme 
Court ended the Florida recount in 2000 because there was not enough time 
to finish it before the expiration of the safe harbor period on December 12 
and the meeting of the Electoral College on December 18.156  One of the 
lessons of Bush v. Gore157 is that election authorities should be given 
sufficient time to complete recounts.  As Foley notes, “two additional 
weeks of uncertainty during the transition period” is a reasonable price to 
pay to ensure that the candidate who is inaugurated on January 20 is “the 
candidate whom the electorate actually chose.”158  The additional time will 
be particularly critical if a nationwide popular vote determines the winner.  
Therefore, extending the deadline for states to report their presidential 
election results must be a key component of any plan for directly electing 
the President. 
5.  Federalized Contingency Planning 
Finally, before every presidential election, Congress should direct the 
FEC and the Department of Homeland Security to form a joint task force on 
election security and resiliency.159  The “Joint Task Force on Presidential 
Elections” would engage in contingency planning for national disasters and 
coordinate election preparations with state authorities.  It also would serve 
as a one-stop shop for state election authorities seeking information and 
assistance in advance of the presidential election. 
A central priority for this Joint Task Force on Presidential Elections must 
be improving physical and electronic security at polling places.160  To that 
end, Congress should provide federal funds for securing voting sites.161  
Federal assistance also will be crucial for safeguarding state voting 
machines from cyberattack.  As the Russian hack of the Democratic 
National Committee in 2016 demonstrated, election-related computer 
systems are a tempting target for foreign adversaries,162 particularly in 
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jurisdictions that use electronic-only voting.163  Thus, Congress should use 
federal funds to incentivize states to adopt voting machines that leave a 
paper trail.  Congress also should amend the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act to make clear that voting machine manufacturers must not shield the 
security of their systems from scrutiny by outside experts.164 
In addition, Congress would be wise to follow the advice of Jerry 
Goldfeder and promulgate guidelines for the states on how to proceed in the 
event of an emergency during a presidential election.165  Belatedly, the 
states have begun to coordinate emergency planning through the 
establishment of the National Association of Secretaries of State Task Force 
on Emergency Preparedness for Elections.166  But a congressional role in 
emergency planning is essential.  As Goldfeder recommends, Congress 
should take the initiative by “establishing a national response to a national 
emergency, rather than leaving the constitutional crisis to be ‘managed’ by 
the various states.”167 
CONCLUSION 
If individual states prefer a disorganized and underfunded process for the 
election of their local and state officials, they are free to continue with their 
present systems.  And if the members of Congress choose to maintain low 
contribution limits on House and Senate candidates, they are within their 
constitutional prerogative in doing so. 
But the presidency is different.  As Woodrow Wilson observed more than 
a century ago, the President is the only officeholder “for whom the whole 
nation votes. . . .  No one else represents the people as a whole exercising a 
national choice.”168  Wilson’s observation remains just as true today.  As 
the leader of a diverse, global superpower, the President represents the 
nation as a whole, not just a single district, state, or region.  Accordingly, it 
is long overdue for the United States to have a presidential election system 
worthy of the office of President. 
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